レイオフ人員の中でも在宅休息の賃金はかなり高く，現役従業員の約48%に当る。しかしながら，在宅休息の年間賃金(約8700元)は，鞍山地域の消費水準を考えると，基本的な生活ができるレベルである O これは， レイオフ人員の中でも在宅休息は，大きな役割を果たしている可能性を示唆している。その一方 レイオフ人員の賃金コスト負担は重く，鞍鋼の全体賃金額の約10.35%を占めている。これは，又，鞍鋼の人員削減のコストは高く，一種の社会保障的役割を果たしていることを示唆している。
1950年代から1970年代にかけて多くの国で労働分配率は上昇したが、その後2000年代にかけては資本の取り分が上昇(労働分配率は低下)した。日本は例外的に2000年代にかけても労働分配率の上昇が続いたと述べている(Anthony B. Atkinson, “Inequality: What Can Be Done?”, Harvard University Press 2015)。
子、孫と子孫が遺産を分割していくので大金持ちの資産は分散して行き、貧しい人達も資産を蓄積して豊かになって、両者ともに平均に回帰すると期待したい。しかし親の成功の結果は普通に考えられているよりも長く子孫に受け継がれているようだ。グレゴリー・クラーク(1957-)が各国の長期に渡る苗字と職業や所得との関係を研究したところでは、社会階層間の移動は意外に遅いという(Gregory Clark, ”The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility”、Princeton University Press 2014)。
凋落する米国、難民問題やテロに揺れる欧州、台頭する中国、そして経済再生への試行錯誤を続ける日本――。混迷する世界はどこへ向かうのか。「ヨーロッパ最高の知性」と称される経済学者、ジャック・アタリ氏は、これまでも、ソ連崩壊、金融バブル、新たなテロの脅威、インターネットによる世界変化などを予測し、見事に的中させてきた。アタリ氏が考える足もとの世界のリスク、そして来るべき新たな世界秩序とはどんなものか。去る2015年12月、株式会社ワークスアプリケーションズが開催した日本最大級のビジネスフォーラム「COMPANY Forum 2015」に参加したアタリ氏の基調講演と氏への単独インタビューの内容を基にお伝えする。（構成／ダイヤモンド・オンライン 小尾拓也）
後者のような使い方は今すぐやめましょう。大好きなSNS無しで生きていくなんて怖くてできないと思う場合は、「Pick the Brain」に載っていた方法を使えば、安心して新しい生活に入っていけます。「SNSをいきなりやめる必要はありません。まずはスマホのSNSのアプリを削除してみましょう。そうすれば、外出先ではSNSから解放されます」。
余剰人員が発生した場合の解雇も、解雇順序の規則、解雇の事前通達期間、再雇用優先権、解雇決定までの手続きが厳しく定められている。解雇順序は俗に“Last in, first out”と呼ばれるもので、勤続年数がいちばん少ない者から解雇される。事前通達期間は勤続年数によって決まり、最短で1カ月、最長で6カ月となっている。また解雇されても9カ月間の再雇用優先権があるため、業績が回復して採用を再開する場合は解雇された従業員を優先的に雇わなければならない。さらに解雇手続をとるにあったっては、その従業員が所属する職能別組合に事前に通告し、解雇回避の措置などについて協議を行なうことも定められている。
Bakshi, G.S. & Z. Chen (1996) "The Spirit of Capitalism and Stock-Market Prices" AER 86 pp.133-157には「Donald Trumpの様な」既に金持ちが何故長時間働き続け，可成りの量のストレスに耐え続け，大きなリスクを取り続けるのかを消費動機だけで説明する事に失敗しているとあったｗ
当該箇所はCole et al. (1992)からの引用箇所ではあるが，例としてDonald Trumpの名を挙げたのはBakshi & Chenの様だ♪
Acemoglu, D. (1998) "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skill? Directed Tecnological Change and Wage Inequality" QJE, 113, 1055-1090
upsurge of wage inequality since 1980's in several developed counties
Autor, Krueger and Katz (1998) "Computing Equality" QJE
この格差の源泉を説明しようとして幾つかの試みが現れた
貿易自由化(標準的なヘクシャーオーリン理論に直接inspireされて可成りstraightforwardであるが，残念ながらevidenceにsupportされない。要するに(in a nutshell)国際化の景気昂揚は相対的にskilled労働が割高な途上国では無く，先進国での需要を高めるが，貿易自由化はその様な大きな労賃への影響を与えていない。また先進国での余りskill集約的で無い財のskill集約的な財に対する価格低下をもたらしそうなものだがそれも観測されていない。)
Galor and Weil (2000) "Polulation, Technology and Growth, From the Malthusian Regime to the Demographic Transition" AER 110, 806-828
Mokyr and Voth (2006) "Understanding Growth in Europe, 1700-1870: Theory and Evidence" Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade Conference Papers c011_002
→Journal of Economic Sociology, 2012, vol. 13, issue 5, pages 57-102 https://ideas.repec.org/p/deg/conpap/c011_002.html
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) "Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences," AER, 90, 829-846.
10.3 From Captal Accumulation to Innovation
Ha and Howitt (2006) "Accounting for Trens in Productivity and R&D: A Schumpeterian Crititue of Semi-Endogenous Growth Theory" JMCB 39, 733-774.
Ha (2002)
■それにしてもFrom K to Aで
Irmen, A. (2005) "Extensive and intensive growth in a neoclassical framework." JEDC 29:1427-1448,
Matsuyama, K. (1999) "Growing through cycles." ECTA 67:335-347,
Zilibotti, F. (1995) "A Rostovian model of endogenous growth and underdevelopment traps." EER 39:1569-1602，
に言及しないなんて。。今気付いたけどZilibottiはAcemogluとも共著してるんだな。
A Nobel Prize-winning economist is back in the spotlight. Christopher Sims is challenging a widely accepted claim. It was the speech he made at the Jackson Hole meeting last summer where central bankers from around the world gathered which caught attention. He argued that in times of low or negative interest rates, monetary easing alone may not be enough to spur inflation. And his theory is inspiring policymakers around the world, especially here in Japan.
NHK World's Reiko Sakurai sat down with Sims during his visit to Tokyo to talk about his theory, and the implications for Abenomics.
Sakurai: It's been a year since the Bank of Japan has introduced a negative interest policy, but it's far from hitting the 2% inflation target. What do you think went wrong?
Sims: I was very optimistic about Abenomics at the beginning, but then when consumption tax increase was implemented in the midst of this, I realized there really was no coordination of fiscal and monetary policy.
And the public realized it too that there was going to be contractionary fiscal policy working against the expansionary monetary policy. And I think that’s why it's had little effect until recently. So in order for it to have a truly expansionary effect, the fiscal policy has to also be aimed at getting inflation back up to the target level. It's easy to understand that when interest rates are negative, the government is pulling money out of banks, and out of to the extent they're negative for individuals on deposits, they are pulling away from individuals and banks. Taking money out of the economy, that's contractionary. Low interest rates are expansionary if the money that's pulled out of the economy, by the low interest rates, is put back in the reduced government surpluses, or increased government deficits.
Sakurai: Prime Minster Abe did postpone the second consumption tax hike to 2019. Do you not think that would be enough?
Sims: It would be better if instead of setting a new date, it’d been made clear that the increase in consumption tax was contingent on getting inflation back up to the target level. That could mean earlier or later increase in the consumption tax. If people see the tying of the consumption tax to inflation as a government commitment to generating inflation, and to being willing to postpone tax increases until they see the inflation, the inflation might actually pick up quite quickly, in which case 2019 might even seem too late.
But more likely -I think- is that by the time we get to the end of 2018, that even if inflation is coming back up, that may not really be solidly over the target, and then people will begin to see that contraction is looming on the horizon, and that might undo the whole policy.
Sakurai: Had not Prime Minister Abe hiked consumption tax as he did first, do you think Abenomics had worked better?
Sims: I think it probably would’ve worked better. Yes. Of course he had this sequence of planned consumption tax increases, and that was at least forward thinking about the budget deficit. I think it is important to build people’s confidence, to have them understand that you have thought through how the adjustments are going to occur in the future. So if you’re going to start targeting inflation with your fiscal policy, you still need to provide credible projections of how a combination of inflation and fiscal stringency is going to lead to being able to manage the debt, and at least keep it from growing faster. So, I'm not against planning possible future tax increases, I'm against doing it in a way that suggest that the future tax increases have nothing to do with inflation.
>>1786
Sakurai: Do you think the BOJ should change the inflation target?
Sims: Well there’s some discussion about whether a higher inflation target would be better. That argument is that if unexpected developments can more easily push you back to the zero lower bound, or deflation, if you have been targeting 2% than if you’ve been targeting 4%.I think there’s something to that argument. There is 4% inflation starts to get to be a level at which people have to worry about it and think about it. And I think there’s lots of benefits to keeping inflation so low that people just don’t pay any attention to it. So, I think that’s a difficult argument, whether a higher inflation target or the current one is better. Now there’re other people who say “We can’t make the 2% our target, so let’s have our target as 1%”. Move the goalposts. And I think that’s actually a big mistake. Because you’ve shown you couldn’t hit your target, why should people believe that this new target is anymore something that you can attain and maintain than the old target was. I think that once you’ve set a target, you should meet it. And that probably with going to a 4% target, now as people have seen that you can't hit a 2% target, why should they believe that you’d be able to hit a 4% target even if you try?
Sakurai: Many worry about Japan becoming the second Greece with a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 200%.Can Japan afford to postpone a consumption tax hike, and increase fiscal spending?
Sims: One big difference between Greece and Japan, and the reason Japan can still have zero-interest rates, whereas Greece pays high interest rates, is that Japan’s debt is almost entirely Yen-denominated debt. The government can print Yen. So a government that can print the money it promises to deliver in its debt, never needs to default. It can always pay what it’s promised to pay, because it’s only promising to pay paper. Greece has Euro debt and Greece cannot print Euros. So Greece, if it can’t make the promised payments, has no choice but to default in some form or other, and they’ve already defaulted, they’re going to default again, they 're going to revalue the debt. So I think the short answer is Japan is actually very different from Greece, even though the ratio of debt-to-GDP is not so different.
Sakurai: Some have pointed out that your ideas are similar to Helicopter Money. What’s the difference?
Sims: Helicopter Money there’s actually several kinds of proposals for it. The name comes from a proposal of Milton Friedman that if you wanted to stimulate inflation you could have the central bank hire a bunch of helicopters and sprinkle money over the countryside. But modern central banks cannot do this. Modern central banks, they’re ordinarily constrained to do open market operations. They buy government debt and sell it trying to control interest rates. They’re not allowed to give gifts of money to people. That’s a fiscal transfer. And in most rich countries, maybe all of them, the central bank is legally bound not to do that. So the proposals that are called Helicopter Money are all proposals that actually do a fiscal expansion, and try to make it appear as much as possible like a monetary policy action.
>>1786-1787
Sims: So they often involve something like the government issuing a lot of debt, and the central bank committing to buy all the debt. The commitment has to involve a promise not to sell the debt. Otherwise it doesn’t look like Helicopter Money. So these schemes, all could work, but I actually don’t like them. Because to make them work, you have to make people understand that they actually involve a fiscal commitment. And calling it Helicopter Money makes it sound like it’s not fiscal. I’d rather that the policy was implemented and explained as a certain kind of fiscal expansion, an unbacked fiscal expansion, and without claiming that it’s something the central bank does by itself. So I think Helicopter Money proposals are well-intentioned attempts to make it feasible to get a fiscal expansion of the type I’ve advocated. But I think they don’t really make it more likely that the policy will be successfully implemented. I think it would be better just to say we need a fiscal expansion, and also this helps to keep clear that this is an unusual period in which we require help from the fiscal authorities for the central bank to fulfill its mission.
Sakurai: Some people see that inflation is one kind of tax on households, and that there is not much difference between an inflation and tax on a household perspective it’s the same thing. Would you agree, and is the difference just on the impact on inflation?
Sims: It’s true inflation is a tax, and it’s just not like other taxes, because it falls more heavily on people who have assets and no loans denominated in Yen. So when I make this proposal I’m not suggesting that financing the debt with inflation is painless. It’s painful and it’ll be more For some people, it will be more painful than financing it by taxes. The reason we want to do this, is not to substitute inflation for taxes and paying the debt. It’s rather because we think that the economy does not function very well when inflation is near zero. Shifting from a tax that keeps inflation at zero, a pure consumption tax, to one -an inflation tax- that may be able to raise a similar amount of revenue, it has an advantage to the function of the economy as a whole. It’s not going to make the true burden of the debt any smaller. The true burden of the debt is the amount of debt out there that can be paid for by taxes explicitly, or can be paid implicitly by inflation, and both of those forms of payments are costly to people. But, if you make the inflation rate go up, we think that the economy may start to function better, and they may actually help to pay off the debt. If you can get growth to get back on a more rapid path, it of course raises the tax base, and makes it much easier to avoid expansion of the debt. What’s needed is an understanding on the part of the public, and the commitment by the government not to increase future taxes or cut future expenditures so long as you’re staying below the targeted inflation rate. And that does not require any major increase in the deficit. It might work quicker if there were an increase in the deficit. There’s some reason to think increased spending in ways that increased employment might increase inflationary pressure. But the fundamental issue is to be sure that this is not seen as just another ineffectual expansion of the deficit.
>>1786-1788
Sakurai: Would a right combination of fiscal and monetary policy be able to solve the problem of secular stagnation?
Sims: I don’t know what I think about secular stagnation. There is a regularity that whenever the economy slows down for any length of the time, some economists start talking about secular stagnation. So this period in history is no different in that respect from many others. That doesn’t mean it’s impossible that we really do have secular stagnation, as I’m sure you know Robert Gordon has argued that there’s something qualitatively different about the recent technical innovations that makes them less productive than what we were seeing in the 30s, 40s and 50s of the twentieth century. I’m not sure I believe that. I think it’s true that a lot of the productive uses of new digital and electronic technology are still being discovered, and it could well be that we could again get growth rates much faster than we have now. I think monetary and fiscal policy has been bad, in most of the rich countries. And that there’s plenty of room for finding out if we’re actually in a technological secular stagnation or not. And the way to find out is get inflation back up to target, and see, does that produce a big growth bonus, or not? I’m not sure that we really do have a permanent secular stagnation problem beyond what’s resulted from inadequate monetary and fiscal policy.
Sakurai: May I ask you about your assessment on Donald Trump’s economic policies?
Sims: I find it very difficult to do that because it’s not at all clear what those policies are yet. Some of the executive orders he’s been signing are temporary or not clearly something that will stand up in court. In his campaign he talked about infrastructure spending, making sure social security and Medicare don’t get changed or reduced. Reducing taxes. This all sounds very expansionary. But he never actually said that it was his policy to run large deficits. And the republicans, who now have the majority in the Congress, have for the last 8 years been extremely reluctant to allow any deficit spending. It’s not clear whether they're really ready to simply turn around and start being happy to make deficit spending because the president has changed. It may well happen, that’s true, but it’s not clear yet. There are people in Congress who have been talking about making deep slashes in other parts of the budget, in order to finance infrastructure spending. And if that turns out to be the dominant policy position, from the point of view of fiscal and monetary contraction, it could be that the Trump initiatives are contractionary rather than expansionary. Wall Street now seems to have the view that Trump’s policies will be expansionary, or are likely to be expansionary. But I think there’s a significant chance that they will turn out to be the opposite.
Sakurai: Well, thank you so much for your time today.
井尻竹次郎とヒロの長男として1935年2月24日に神戸市で生れる。幼少の頃より計算に興味を持ち、6歳よりそろばん塾に通う。高校１年になったとき、ベーカリーを営む父より経理を任される。その仕事に興味を持ち公認会計士への道に進む。奈良商業高等学校を卒業する直前の1952年に、大学の学位学業を持たずに公認会計士一次試験に合格する。その後、同志社短期大学商学部夜間部に学び、1953年に第二次試験に合格する。3年間の実務実習の期間に立命館大学に学び、1956年法学士の学位を得る。同じくこの年21歳で公認会計士の資格要件をすべて満たす。現在でも公認会計士取得の最年少記録を保持する。
大学卒業後、最初は東京の個人会計事務所に、その後プライス・ウォーターハウスで3カ年間の監査実務を実践する。1959年にプライス・ウォーターハウスを離れ、米国ミネソタ大学大学院に学び、1960年に修士号を得る。その後、カーネギーメロン大学に学び1963年に博士号を得る。
スタンフォード大学の教員として1963年から67年まで、助教授(63-65）、準教授(65-67)を務める。1967年に正教授としてカーネギーメロン大学に戻る。1975年に、Robert M. Trueblood Professor of Accounting and Economicsの称号を得る。1987年には、Robert M. Trueblood University Professor of Accounting and Economics に推挙任命される。University Professorship は大学が教員に与える最高位の栄誉である。
会計を専門分野として様々な組織や機関で活躍をしてきた。アメリカ会計学会（AAA）のメンバーとなった1963年以降、同学会の数多くの委員会や役職を歴任した。その中には会長職（1982-83）、副会長職（1974-75）が含まれる。また、企業やNPO法人のコンサルタントを務める。
専門誌への投稿は優に200編を超えている。また、数多くの研究論文や著書を執筆し、その中にはノーベル経済学賞のハーバート・アレクサンダー・サイモン教授との共著（1977）など以下の著書が含まれる。
「人口規模1億人を維持しようと思えば1.3千万人の社会増」が必要となり、人口の1〜3割が移民となる状態に日本人は耐えられない、というのが上野氏の診断であるが、なぜそうも「日本人」に優しいのか理解できない。人口に占める外国出生者の比率は、スイス28.3％、豪27.6％、カナダ20％、北欧、英独仏蘭も10％を超える。1.1％の日本が多文化状況に懸念を持つなどとんでもない話である（OECD International Migration Outlook 2015にもとづくhttp://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/1170a.html参照）。準備をしてから心配をしろ、というスタート地点百歩前の状態である。
Photo by GettyImages
一方日本は、このような参入障壁がない上に、コンビニやスーパーの惣菜など、他業界との競合も多いことから、利用者が飲食店に求める味のレベルは高くなり、提供価格は驚くほどに安い。いや、利用者にとってはいいことなのだが、飲食業者にとっては、厳しい条件が２つものしかかってくる。
そこで、セイラー教授とカリフォルニア大学ロサンゼルス校（UCLA）のシュロモ・ベナルツィ教授は、「セーブ・モア・トゥモロー（Save More Tomorrow、明日はもっと貯めよう）」というプログラムを考案した。一定の金額を401ｋへの積み立てに回すことを基準とし、貯蓄を増やすよう従業員たちを「ナッジ」するというものだ。
行動経済学の科学が直面する課題は、私たちが退職後に個人の尊厳を維持することを支援し、金融に関するその他の目標を達成することを支援するということだ。当然ながら、行動経済学には今後なすべきことが数多くある。だが、私たちはお金の問題に関して、以前より安全な世界にいる。セイラー教授の優れた働きのおかげだ。
John Wasik
経済学では選好パラメーターは一定と措くことが多いけどStigler & Becker(1977)辺りが云ってたらしい。論文の表題はラテン語みたいだけどどんな意味か判らん(;´Д｀)
で，勿論，変化するってのも調べられてて，災害時にリスク回避的になったり主観的割引率が高くなったりするらしい(Voor et al. 2012, Cameron & Shah 2013)。まあ予想は付くけどねえ。
Reference
Stigler, George J. and Gary S. Becker. 1977. “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”
American Economic Review. 67: 76-90.
Voors, M., T. Turley, A. Kontoleon, E. Bulte, and J. A. List (2012): “Exploring whether
Behavior in Context-Free Experiments is Predictive of Behavior in the Field: Evidence from Lab
and Field Experiments in Rural Sierra Leone,” Economics Letters, 114(3), 308?311.
Cameron, L., and M. Shah (2013): “Risk-Taking Behavior in the Wake of Natural Disasters,”
NBER Working Paper 19534, National Bureau of Economic Research.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9679
Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach
Edward P. Lazear
NBER Working Paper No. 9679
Issued in May 2003
NBER Program(s):Labor Studies
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/648671?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Firm‐Specific Human Capital: A Skill‐Weights Approach
Edward P. Lazear
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 117, No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 914-94
『時は金なり』の言葉の本質は機会費用（opportunity cost）の概念にある
この『時は金なり（Time is money）』という言葉はまれに、「時間は全てお金に換算して考えないとダメ」であったり「時間は全てお金に換金することを前提に考えるべき」といった誤解をされる方もいらっしゃいますがこれは誤りです。
というのも、『時は金なり（Time is money）』という言葉は機会費用の考え方の重要性を私たちに教えてくれている言葉だからです。
ピケティも絶賛する反格差の活動家の書をなぜ本田圭佑が薦めたのか
たしかに、矢部氏の言うように、同書は2011年の出版以来、資本主義の本質と問題点を明らかにした書として、リベラル知識人や経済学者の間で非常に注目されてきた。『21世紀の資本』で知られる経済学者のトマ・ピケティも「『負債論』、愛しています(I Love Debt)」とコメント。また、ベーシックインカムの導入と1日3時間労働の提唱で話題になった『隷属なき道』（ルトガー・ブレグマン著／文藝春秋）にも大きな影響を与えたといわれる。ブレグマンは「数えきれないほど多くの人々が、仕事人生の全てを、自ら無意味と思う仕事に費やしている」という、グレーバーの論を踏まえた論を展開している。
Returns to scale in research https://aiimpacts.org/returns-to-scale-in-research/
2016-07-06 Featured Articles, Intelligence explosion, Pace of AI Progress (Without Feedback), Speed of AI Transition 0
When universities or university departments produce research outputs?such as published papers?they sometimes experience increasing returns to scale, sometimes constant returns to scale, and sometimes decreasing returns to scale. At the level of nations however, R&D tends to see increasing returns to scale. These results are preliminary.
Background
“Returns to scale” refers to the responsiveness of a process’ outputs when all inputs (e.g. researcher hours, equipment) are increased by a certain proportion. If all outputs (e.g. published papers, citations, patents) increase by that same proportion, the process is said to exhibit constant returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale and decreasing returns to scale refer to situations where outputs still increase, but by a higher or lower proportion, respectively.
Assessing returns to scale in research may be useful in predicting certain aspects of the development of artificial intelligence, in particular the dynamics of an intelligence explosion.
Results
The conclusions in this article are drawn from an incomplete review of academic literature assessing research efficiency, presented in Table 1. These papers assess research in terms of its direct outputs such as published papers, citations, and patents. The broader effects of the research are not considered.
Most of the papers listed below use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique, which is a quantitative technique commonly used to assess the efficiency of universities and research activities. It is capable of isolating the scale efficiency of the individual departments, universities or countries being studied.
Paper Level of comparison Activities assessed Results pertaining to returns to scale
Wang & Huang 2007 Countries’ overall R&D activities Research Increasing returns to scale in research are exhibited by more than two-thirds of the sample
Kocher, Luptacik & Sutter 2006 Countries’ R&D in economics Research Increasing returns to scale are found in all countries in the sample except the US
Cherchye & Abeele 2005 Dutch universities’ research in Economics and Business Management Research Returns to scale vary between decreasing, constant and increasing depending on each university’s specialization
Johnes & Johnes 1993 UK universities’ research in economics Research Constant returns to scale are found in the sample as a whole
Avkiran 2001 Australian universities Research, education Constant returns to scale found in most sampled universities
Ahn 1988 US universities Research, education Decreasing returns to scale on average
Johnes 2006 English universities Research, education Close to constant returns to scale exhibited by most universities sampled
Kao & Hung 2008 Departments of a Taiwanese university Research, education Increasing returns to scale exhibited by the five most scale-inefficient departments. However, no aggregate measure of returns to scale within the sample is presented.
Table 1: Sample of studies of research efficiency that assess returns to scale
Note: This table only identifies increasing/constant/decreasing returns to scale, rather than the size of this effect. Although DEA can measure the relative size of the effect for individual departments/universities/countries within a sample, such results cannot be readily compared between samples/studies.
「Nobel Prizes in Economics, Awarded and Withheld」と題されたEconospeakエントリでピーター・ドーマンが、今年度のノーベル経済学賞は誰が受賞したかよりも誰が受賞しなかったかに注目すべき、と書いている。以下はその末尾。
The reality is this is a nonprize for Weitzman, an attempt to dismiss his approach to combating climate change, even though his position is far closer to the scientific mainstream than Nordhaus’. An example of the enlistment of the uncritical media in this enterprise is today’s New York Times, where Binyamin Appelbaum writes:
Mr. Nordhaus also was honored for his role in developing a model that allows economists to analyze the costs of climate change. His work undergirds a new United Nations report on the dangers of climate change, released Monday in South Korea.
Wrong. The work Nordhaus pioneered in the social cost of carbon is mentioned only twice in the IPCC report, a box in Chapter 2 and another in Chapter 3. The reason it appears only in boxes is that, while the authors of the report wanted to include this work in the interest of being comprehensive, it plays no role in any of their substantive conclusions. And how could it? The report is about the dangers of even just 1.5o of warming, less than the conventional 2o target, and far less than the 3+o Nordhaus is comfortable with. Damages are expressed primarily in terms of uninhabitable land and climate refugees, agricultural failure and food security, and similarly nonmonetary outcomes, not the utility-from-consumption metric on which Nordhaus’ work rests.
The Nordhaus/Romer combo is so artificial and unconvincing it’s hard to avoid the impression that the prize not given to Weitzman is as important as the one given to Nordhaus. This is a clear political statement about how to deal with climate change and how not to deal with it. The Riksbank has spoken: it wants a gradual approach to carbon, one that makes as few economic demands as possible.
ウィリアム・ペティ（William Petty）は，イギリスの17世紀重商主義期において，経済学，財政学，統計学に関する多くの著作を公刊した。それらのうち，財政的著作としては，『租税および貢納論』（A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions, 1662）と『賢者には一言をもって足る』（Verbum Sapienti, 1691）（以下，『賢者一言』と略称）が主要な体系をなしている。これら両著作は，その成立の社会的諸事情において相通ずるものをもち，しかもその主題においても一致している。すなわち，両著作とも，当時のイギリスにおける最大かつ緊急の経済問題であった財政の基礎確立のための租税政策を提示する目的をもって執筆されたものである。『租税および貢納論』をペティの租税論と呼ぶならば，『賢者一言』はかれの戦時租税論と呼ばれるべき著作であるといってよい。
新しい経済成長論」の概要と関連する議論については膨大な文献があるが、それらをまとめた代表的なテキストブックとして、レベル別にWeil［2005］、Jones［2003］、Barro and Sala-i-Martin［2004］、Aghion and Howitt［1998］などがある。このなかでも特にWeil［2005］に象徴されるように、最近のテキストブックにおいては、かなりのページを割いて開発途上国に関する言及が増えている。またRay［1998］のように、経済発展論・開発経済論のテキストブックにおいても「新しい成長論」に対する章を設けるなど、両分野における相互乗り入れは活発になってきている。
Pritchett (2001) やBenhabib & Spiegel (1994)が教育がどっか行ったと騒いだが，これらの結論は近年，より正確なデータで修正されうる事を一部の研究，Cohen and Soto (2007)やFuente and Dom\´enech (2006)等で修正を迫られているようだ。good data, good resultsだそうだが安倍に汚された日本はデータが穢いんであかんな，，こんなんだから成長できひん┐('〜`；)┌
Fuente and Domenech (2006)ではこれらの両極端な結果が人的資本の計測に関わっていると明らかにした。
概念上明確な定義が存在してこなかった。
学修年限は良いproxyだと長いこと認識されてきた。
併し単純にデータにさっと目を通しても学修年限の成長率が最も早い地域はとても低開発の国である。だから平均学修年限average years of schooling を二倍にしたからといって人的資本ストックが二倍になるとは信じられない。
We then construct indicators of the information
content of our estimates and a number of previously available data sets and examine their
performance in several growth specifications.
Over the past two decades, real median wage growth (実質中央値賃金成長) in many OECD countries has decoupled(分離された) from labour productivity growth, partly reflecting declines in labour income shares(一部は労働所得シェアの低下を反映して). This paper analyses the drivers of labour share developments(労働シェアの進展[変化]の推進要素) using a combination of industry-and firm-level data. Technological change in the investment goods-producing sector(投資財生産部門の技術変化) and greater global value chain participation(より巨大な地球規模のヴァリューチェーンへの参加) have compressed(押し込む) labour shares, but the effect of technological change has been significantly less pronounced(顕著←pronounce：発音する・宣言する) for high-skilled workers(技術進歩の高熟練労働者への(負の？)効果ははっきりしない). Countries with falling labour shares have witnessed(目撃する→経験する[目の当たりにするって感じか]) both a decline at the technological frontier(技術的尖端からの脱落(？←減退)，技術フロンティアの低落？？生産性フロンティア？) and a reallocation of market shares toward “superstar” firms with low labour shares(低労働シェアの総取り優秀企業への市場シェアの再配分) (“winner-takes-most” dynamics). The decline at the technological frontier mainly reflects the entry of firms with low labour shares into the frontier rather than a decline of labour shares in incumbent frontier firms, suggesting that thus far(此迄の所) this process is mainly explained by technological dynamism rather than anti-competitive forces(反競争的力？→独占力？).
The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2013-27.pdf
Elsby, Michael W L, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin, (2013) "The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. Fall.
Over the past quarter century, labor’s share of income in the United States has trended downwards, reaching its lowest level in the postwar period after the Great Recession(大恐慌後の戦後期[こんな言い方あるのか?!]で最も低い水準に達した). Detailed examination of the magnitude, determinants and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions(この減少の大きさ，決定要因及び含意を詳細に調べることに拠って５つの結論を得た). First, around one third of the decline in the published labor share(公表された労働シェアの減少の１／３が) is an artifact(人工物) of a progressive(進歩的な→漸進的な) understatement(控えめな表現) of the labor income of the self-employed underlying the headline measure(自営業の基礎にある大見出しの計測器の労働収入？？). Second, movements in labor’s share are not a feature solely of recent U.S. history(最近のＵＳ史のみの特徴では無い): The relative stability of the aggregate labor share prior to the 1980s(1980年代より前の比較的安定した総動労シェア) in fact veiled substantial(実態のある→しっかりした), though offsetting(offset:埋め合わせる・相殺するもの),movements in labor shares within industries(産業内の確固たるしかし相殺的な動きで実際には隠されていた). By contrast, the recent decline has been dominated by trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital for (unskilled) labor to exploit(利用する・搾り取る) technical change embodied in new capital goods(新しい資本に体化された技術進歩を利用する為の(非熟練)労働の資本への代替という新古典派に基づいた説明に対するサポートは限定的である). Fourth, institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization(労働組合組織率の低下に基づいた組織論的説明) also receive weak support. Finally, we provide evidence that highlights the offshoring of the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply chain(アメリカのサプライチェーンの労働集約的な構成要素の海外移転) as a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor shareover the past 25 years.
本文より
The headline measure published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (BLSより公表されたheadline measure代表的尺度？？) historically fluctuated around a mean of close to 64 percent from the immediate postwar period to the mid-1980s.
Thereafter, aside from a brief surge(急上昇・サージ電流は雷等に拠る電流急上昇) surrounding the tech bubble at the turn of the21st century(21世紀の変わり目の), this measure has displayed a downward trend, averaging around 58 percent in recent years, 6 percentage points below the level that prevailed during the first four decades of the postwar period.
…
●Autor, David, Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane (2003) ?The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An
Empirical Exploration" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279-1333.
Autor, David, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney (2006) ?The Polarization of the US Labor Market," American
Economic Review, 96(2), 189-194.
Autor, David, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney (2008) ?Trends in US Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90(2), 300-323.
▲Card, David and John E. DiNardo (2002) ?Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles," Journal of Labor Economics 20, 733-783.
●Goos, Maarten and Alan Manning (2007) ?Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain," Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 118-133.
▲Manning, Alan (2004) ? We Can Work It Out: The Impact of Technological Change on the Demand for Low-Skill
Workers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 51(5), 581-603.
●Spitz-Oener, Alexandra (2006) ?Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational Demands: Looking outside
the Wage Structure," Journal of Labor Economics 24, 235-270.
…, certain features of specification of preferences are tied to basic growth observations for the U.S. economy. There is evidence that per capita leisure increased steadily until the 1930s. Since that time, and certainly for the postwar period, it has been approximately constant. We also know that real wages (defined as real average hourly rotal compensation[償い・埋め合わせ・代償・給与] ), including benefits and contributions for social insurance) have increased steadily in the postwar period. Taken together, these two observations imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure should be near unity. ...
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Lawrence F.K., Patterson, C., and Van Reenen, J.（2017）,“The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms”, NBER Working Paper No.23396
Elsby,M.,Hobijn,B.,andSahin,A.（2013）,“The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol47,no.2,pp.1-63
”Physicists’ approach to studying socio-economicinequalities: Can humans be modelled as atoms?”
Kiran Sharma and Anirban Chakraborti https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06051
A brief overview of the models and data analyses of income, wealth, consumption distributions by the physicists, are presented here(物理学者による所得分布等のモデルとデータ分析の簡単な概観が述べられている). It has been found empirically that the distributions of income and wealth possess fairly robust features, like the bulk of(〜の大部分) both the income and wealth distributions seem to reasonably fit both the log-normal and Gamma distributions, while the tail of the distribution fits well to a power law (as first observed by sociologist Pareto)(実証的に，所得と富の保有の分布はかなりロバストで，所得と富の分布の大宗bulkはかなり対数正規とガンマ分布に似ている一方で分布の尾tailの分布は(社会学者パレートに先ず観測された様に)冪法則に良くfitしている). We also present our recent studies of the unit-level expenditure on consumption(単位水準消費支出？) across multiple countries and multiple years, where it was found that there exist invariant(不変量・不変の) features of consumption distribution(消費分布に不変量の特徴→消費分布が一定である特徴？): the bulk is log-normally distributed, followed by a power law tail at the limit. The mechanisms leading to such inequalities and invariant features for the distributions of socio-economic variables are not well-understood. We also present some simple models from physics and demonstrate how they can be used to explain some of these findings and their consequences.
B.K. Chakrabarti, A. Chakraborti, S.R. Chakravarty and A. Chatterjee, Econophysics ofIncome and Wealth Distributions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
S. Sinha, A. Chatterjee, A. Chakraborti and B.K. Chakrabarti, Econophysics: An Introduc-tion (Wiley-VCH, Berlin, 2010).
F. Slanina Essentials of econophysics modelling (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013).
M. Patriarca, E. Heinsalu, A. Singh and A. Chakraborti, “Kinetic Exchange Models asDDimensional Systems: A Comparison of Different Approaches”, in Eds. F. Abergel et al.,Econophysics and Sociophysics: Recent Progress and Future Directions(Springer, Milan,2017), pp 147-158.
所得分布の研究は古くからある研究であり，所得分布は，社会保障，労働，財政，マクロ，消費，経済統計など多くの領域にまたがる問題である．橘木俊詔（1998）『日本の経済格差』および，大竹文雄（2005）『日本の不平等』が，日本の経済格差の問題について大きな論争を呼びおこした．その結果，日本の不平等度が米国より高いということはないが，90年代以降，少しずつ上昇していることにはコンセンサスができてきている．一方，Journal of EconomicInequalityが2003年に発刊されるなど，世界的にも所得格差の問題は関心を集めている．
所得分布で用いられる…々の分布についてはKleiber and Kotz (2003)に詳しい説明がある．そして，本研究では２パラメータのパレート分布および対数正規分布を用いる．…指数分布の部分順序統計量にもとづく推定の研究はSaleh and Ali(1966)など，1960年代に盛んに行われていたが，Saleh and Ali (1966)では，この推定量をABLUE(Asymptotically BLUE)としている．
Nirei, M. and W. Souma (2007). “A Two Factor Model of Income Distribution Dy-namics,”Review of Income and Wealth,53, 440?459.
Saleh, A. K. Md. E. and M. M. Ali (1966).“Asymptotic Optimum Quantiles for theEstimation of the Parameters of the Negative Exponential Distribution,”Annals ofMathematical Statisitcs,37, 143?151.
Singh, S. K. and G. S. Maddala (1976). “A Function for Size Distribution of Incomes,”Econometrica,44, 963?970.
Kleiber, C and S. Kotz (2003).Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actu-arialSciences, Wiley, New York
連続数学でやってきたので離散数学は苦手なんだけど，有限の特許期間など微分差分方程式を解くなど，離散系も奥深そう。
有限の特許期間はLin and Shampine (2018)が the patent length does not essentially matter with respect to endogenous growth (or at least its qualitative properties)と結論付けてからはまあ良いかなって感じ。
Lin, H.C., Shampine, L.F., (2018) "R&D-based calibrated growth models with finite-length patents: A novel relaxation algorithm for solving an autonomous FDE systems of mixed type" Computational Economics 51, 123?158
Inflation and economic growth in a Schumpeterian model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous firms
Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa, Liao
European Economic Review 98, 2017, 392-409
ttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292117301319
・This article analyzes the effects of monetary policy on economic growth via a cash-in-advance constraint on R&D investment.
・We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy and find that the growth-maximizing inflation rate is about 3%, which is consistent with recent empirical estimates.
The optimal inflation rate under Schumpeterian growth
Oikawa & Ueda
Journal of Monetary Economics 100, 2018, 114-125
tps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393218303970
・An endogenous growth model with creative destruction and menu costs is constructed.
・With the calibrated model, the optimal inflation rate is about ?2%.
人的資本が減価する要因については, 前述の加齢・傷病による消耗 (wear)や, 技術進歩による陳腐化などが指摘されている(De Grip and Van Loo, 2002)｡
De Grip, A. and J. Van Loo (2002) ?The Economics of Skills
Obsolescence: A Review," De Grip, A., J. Van Loo, and K.
Mayhew eds. The Economics of Skilles Obsolescence: Theoretical Innovations and Emripcial Applications, Elsevier, pp. 1-26.
Neuman, S. and A. Weiss (1995) ?On The Effect of Schooling
Vintage on Experience-earnings Profiles: Theory and
Evidence," European Economic Review, 39, pp. 943-945
Ramirez, J. V. (2002) ?Age and Schooling Vintage Effects
on Earnings Profiles in Switzerland," A. De Grip, J. Van
Loo, and K. Mayhew eds. The Economics of Skilles Obsolescence: Theoretical Innovations and Emripcial Applications, Elsevier, pp. 83-99
Blanchard, Oliver （1997）“The Medium Run,”Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, pp. 89?158
Karabarbounis, L. and B. Neiman （2014）“The Global Decline of the Labor Share,”The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 129, No. 1, pp. 61?103, feb, DOI：http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt032.
Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen （2017）“The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms,”Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, DOI：http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23396.
Dao, Mai Chi, Mitali Das, Zsoka Koczan, and Weicheng Lian （2017）“Why Is Labor Receiving a Smaller Share of Global Income? Theory and Empirical Evidence,”Technical report, International Monetary Fund.
De Grip, A. and J. Van Loo (2002) ?The Economics of Skills Obsolescence: A Review," De Grip, A., J. Van Loo, and K. Mayhew eds. The Economics of Skilles Obsolescence: Theoretical Innovations and Emripcial Applications, Elsevier, pp. 1-26.
Neuman, S. and A. Weiss (1995) ?On The Effect of Schooling Vintage on Experience-earnings Profiles: Theory and Evidence," European Economic Review, 39, pp. 943-945
Ramirez, J. V. (2002) ?Age and Schooling Vintage Effects on Earnings Profiles in Switzerland," A. De Grip, J. Van Loo, and K. Mayhew eds. The Economics of Skilles Obsolescence: Theoretical Innovations and Emripcial Applications, Elsevier, pp. 83-99
