余剰人員が発生した場合の解雇も、解雇順序の規則、解雇の事前通達期間、再雇用優先権、解雇決定までの手続きが厳しく定められている。解雇順序は俗に“Last in, first out”と呼ばれるもので、勤続年数がいちばん少ない者から解雇される。事前通達期間は勤続年数によって決まり、最短で1カ月、最長で6カ月となっている。また解雇されても9カ月間の再雇用優先権があるため、業績が回復して採用を再開する場合は解雇された従業員を優先的に雇わなければならない。さらに解雇手続をとるにあったっては、その従業員が所属する職能別組合に事前に通告し、解雇回避の措置などについて協議を行なうことも定められている。
Bakshi, G.S. & Z. Chen (1996) "The Spirit of Capitalism and Stock-Market Prices" AER 86 pp.133-157には「Donald Trumpの様な」既に金持ちが何故長時間働き続け，可成りの量のストレスに耐え続け，大きなリスクを取り続けるのかを消費動機だけで説明する事に失敗しているとあったｗ
当該箇所はCole et al. (1992)からの引用箇所ではあるが，例としてDonald Trumpの名を挙げたのはBakshi & Chenの様だ♪
Acemoglu, D. (1998) "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skill? Directed Tecnological Change and Wage Inequality" QJE, 113, 1055-1090
upsurge of wage inequality since 1980's in several developed counties
Autor, Krueger and Katz (1998) "Computing Equality" QJE
この格差の源泉を説明しようとして幾つかの試みが現れた
貿易自由化(標準的なヘクシャーオーリン理論に直接inspireされて可成りstraightforwardであるが，残念ながらevidenceにsupportされない。要するに(in a nutshell)国際化の景気昂揚は相対的にskilled労働が割高な途上国では無く，先進国での需要を高めるが，貿易自由化はその様な大きな労賃への影響を与えていない。また先進国での余りskill集約的で無い財のskill集約的な財に対する価格低下をもたらしそうなものだがそれも観測されていない。)
Galor and Weil (2000) "Polulation, Technology and Growth, From the Malthusian Regime to the Demographic Transition" AER 110, 806-828
Mokyr and Voth (2006) "Understanding Growth in Europe, 1700-1870: Theory and Evidence" Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade Conference Papers c011_002
→Journal of Economic Sociology, 2012, vol. 13, issue 5, pages 57-102 https://ideas.repec.org/p/deg/conpap/c011_002.html
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) "Endogenous Growth and Cross-Country Income Differences," AER, 90, 829-846.
10.3 From Captal Accumulation to Innovation
Ha and Howitt (2006) "Accounting for Trens in Productivity and R&D: A Schumpeterian Crititue of Semi-Endogenous Growth Theory" JMCB 39, 733-774.
Ha (2002)
■それにしてもFrom K to Aで
Irmen, A. (2005) "Extensive and intensive growth in a neoclassical framework." JEDC 29:1427-1448,
Matsuyama, K. (1999) "Growing through cycles." ECTA 67:335-347,
Zilibotti, F. (1995) "A Rostovian model of endogenous growth and underdevelopment traps." EER 39:1569-1602，
に言及しないなんて。。今気付いたけどZilibottiはAcemogluとも共著してるんだな。
A Nobel Prize-winning economist is back in the spotlight. Christopher Sims is challenging a widely accepted claim. It was the speech he made at the Jackson Hole meeting last summer where central bankers from around the world gathered which caught attention. He argued that in times of low or negative interest rates, monetary easing alone may not be enough to spur inflation. And his theory is inspiring policymakers around the world, especially here in Japan.
NHK World's Reiko Sakurai sat down with Sims during his visit to Tokyo to talk about his theory, and the implications for Abenomics.
Sakurai: It's been a year since the Bank of Japan has introduced a negative interest policy, but it's far from hitting the 2% inflation target. What do you think went wrong?
Sims: I was very optimistic about Abenomics at the beginning, but then when consumption tax increase was implemented in the midst of this, I realized there really was no coordination of fiscal and monetary policy.
And the public realized it too that there was going to be contractionary fiscal policy working against the expansionary monetary policy. And I think that’s why it's had little effect until recently. So in order for it to have a truly expansionary effect, the fiscal policy has to also be aimed at getting inflation back up to the target level. It's easy to understand that when interest rates are negative, the government is pulling money out of banks, and out of to the extent they're negative for individuals on deposits, they are pulling away from individuals and banks. Taking money out of the economy, that's contractionary. Low interest rates are expansionary if the money that's pulled out of the economy, by the low interest rates, is put back in the reduced government surpluses, or increased government deficits.
Sakurai: Prime Minster Abe did postpone the second consumption tax hike to 2019. Do you not think that would be enough?
Sims: It would be better if instead of setting a new date, it’d been made clear that the increase in consumption tax was contingent on getting inflation back up to the target level. That could mean earlier or later increase in the consumption tax. If people see the tying of the consumption tax to inflation as a government commitment to generating inflation, and to being willing to postpone tax increases until they see the inflation, the inflation might actually pick up quite quickly, in which case 2019 might even seem too late.
But more likely -I think- is that by the time we get to the end of 2018, that even if inflation is coming back up, that may not really be solidly over the target, and then people will begin to see that contraction is looming on the horizon, and that might undo the whole policy.
Sakurai: Had not Prime Minister Abe hiked consumption tax as he did first, do you think Abenomics had worked better?
Sims: I think it probably would’ve worked better. Yes. Of course he had this sequence of planned consumption tax increases, and that was at least forward thinking about the budget deficit. I think it is important to build people’s confidence, to have them understand that you have thought through how the adjustments are going to occur in the future. So if you’re going to start targeting inflation with your fiscal policy, you still need to provide credible projections of how a combination of inflation and fiscal stringency is going to lead to being able to manage the debt, and at least keep it from growing faster. So, I'm not against planning possible future tax increases, I'm against doing it in a way that suggest that the future tax increases have nothing to do with inflation.
