「Nobel Prizes in Economics, Awarded and Withheld」と題されたEconospeakエントリでピーター・ドーマンが、今年度のノーベル経済学賞は誰が受賞したかよりも誰が受賞しなかったかに注目すべき、と書いている。以下はその末尾。
The reality is this is a nonprize for Weitzman, an attempt to dismiss his approach to combating climate change, even though his position is far closer to the scientific mainstream than Nordhaus’. An example of the enlistment of the uncritical media in this enterprise is today’s New York Times, where Binyamin Appelbaum writes:
Mr. Nordhaus also was honored for his role in developing a model that allows economists to analyze the costs of climate change. His work undergirds a new United Nations report on the dangers of climate change, released Monday in South Korea.
Wrong. The work Nordhaus pioneered in the social cost of carbon is mentioned only twice in the IPCC report, a box in Chapter 2 and another in Chapter 3. The reason it appears only in boxes is that, while the authors of the report wanted to include this work in the interest of being comprehensive, it plays no role in any of their substantive conclusions. And how could it? The report is about the dangers of even just 1.5o of warming, less than the conventional 2o target, and far less than the 3+o Nordhaus is comfortable with. Damages are expressed primarily in terms of uninhabitable land and climate refugees, agricultural failure and food security, and similarly nonmonetary outcomes, not the utility-from-consumption metric on which Nordhaus’ work rests.
The Nordhaus/Romer combo is so artificial and unconvincing it’s hard to avoid the impression that the prize not given to Weitzman is as important as the one given to Nordhaus. This is a clear political statement about how to deal with climate change and how not to deal with it. The Riksbank has spoken: it wants a gradual approach to carbon, one that makes as few economic demands as possible.
ウィリアム・ペティ（William Petty）は，イギリスの17世紀重商主義期において，経済学，財政学，統計学に関する多くの著作を公刊した。それらのうち，財政的著作としては，『租税および貢納論』（A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions, 1662）と『賢者には一言をもって足る』（Verbum Sapienti, 1691）（以下，『賢者一言』と略称）が主要な体系をなしている。これら両著作は，その成立の社会的諸事情において相通ずるものをもち，しかもその主題においても一致している。すなわち，両著作とも，当時のイギリスにおける最大かつ緊急の経済問題であった財政の基礎確立のための租税政策を提示する目的をもって執筆されたものである。『租税および貢納論』をペティの租税論と呼ぶならば，『賢者一言』はかれの戦時租税論と呼ばれるべき著作であるといってよい。
新しい経済成長論」の概要と関連する議論については膨大な文献があるが、それらをまとめた代表的なテキストブックとして、レベル別にWeil［2005］、Jones［2003］、Barro and Sala-i-Martin［2004］、Aghion and Howitt［1998］などがある。このなかでも特にWeil［2005］に象徴されるように、最近のテキストブックにおいては、かなりのページを割いて開発途上国に関する言及が増えている。またRay［1998］のように、経済発展論・開発経済論のテキストブックにおいても「新しい成長論」に対する章を設けるなど、両分野における相互乗り入れは活発になってきている。
Pritchett (2001) やBenhabib & Spiegel (1994)が教育がどっか行ったと騒いだが，これらの結論は近年，より正確なデータで修正されうる事を一部の研究，Cohen and Soto (2007)やFuente and Dom\´enech (2006)等で修正を迫られているようだ。good data, good resultsだそうだが安倍に汚された日本はデータが穢いんであかんな，，こんなんだから成長できひん┐('〜`；)┌
Fuente and Domenech (2006)ではこれらの両極端な結果が人的資本の計測に関わっていると明らかにした。
概念上明確な定義が存在してこなかった。
学修年限は良いproxyだと長いこと認識されてきた。
併し単純にデータにさっと目を通しても学修年限の成長率が最も早い地域はとても低開発の国である。だから平均学修年限average years of schooling を二倍にしたからといって人的資本ストックが二倍になるとは信じられない。
We then construct indicators of the information
content of our estimates and a number of previously available data sets and examine their
performance in several growth specifications.
Over the past two decades, real median wage growth (実質中央値賃金成長) in many OECD countries has decoupled(分離された) from labour productivity growth, partly reflecting declines in labour income shares(一部は労働所得シェアの低下を反映して). This paper analyses the drivers of labour share developments(労働シェアの進展[変化]の推進要素) using a combination of industry-and firm-level data. Technological change in the investment goods-producing sector(投資財生産部門の技術変化) and greater global value chain participation(より巨大な地球規模のヴァリューチェーンへの参加) have compressed(押し込む) labour shares, but the effect of technological change has been significantly less pronounced(顕著←pronounce：発音する・宣言する) for high-skilled workers(技術進歩の高熟練労働者への(負の？)効果ははっきりしない). Countries with falling labour shares have witnessed(目撃する→経験する[目の当たりにするって感じか]) both a decline at the technological frontier(技術的尖端からの脱落(？←減退)，技術フロンティアの低落？？生産性フロンティア？) and a reallocation of market shares toward “superstar” firms with low labour shares(低労働シェアの総取り優秀企業への市場シェアの再配分) (“winner-takes-most” dynamics). The decline at the technological frontier mainly reflects the entry of firms with low labour shares into the frontier rather than a decline of labour shares in incumbent frontier firms, suggesting that thus far(此迄の所) this process is mainly explained by technological dynamism rather than anti-competitive forces(反競争的力？→独占力？).
The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2013-27.pdf
Elsby, Michael W L, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegul Sahin, (2013) "The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. Fall.
Over the past quarter century, labor’s share of income in the United States has trended downwards, reaching its lowest level in the postwar period after the Great Recession(大恐慌後の戦後期[こんな言い方あるのか?!]で最も低い水準に達した). Detailed examination of the magnitude, determinants and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions(この減少の大きさ，決定要因及び含意を詳細に調べることに拠って５つの結論を得た). First, around one third of the decline in the published labor share(公表された労働シェアの減少の１／３が) is an artifact(人工物) of a progressive(進歩的な→漸進的な) understatement(控えめな表現) of the labor income of the self-employed underlying the headline measure(自営業の基礎にある大見出しの計測器の労働収入？？). Second, movements in labor’s share are not a feature solely of recent U.S. history(最近のＵＳ史のみの特徴では無い): The relative stability of the aggregate labor share prior to the 1980s(1980年代より前の比較的安定した総動労シェア) in fact veiled substantial(実態のある→しっかりした), though offsetting(offset:埋め合わせる・相殺するもの),movements in labor shares within industries(産業内の確固たるしかし相殺的な動きで実際には隠されていた). By contrast, the recent decline has been dominated by trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital for (unskilled) labor to exploit(利用する・搾り取る) technical change embodied in new capital goods(新しい資本に体化された技術進歩を利用する為の(非熟練)労働の資本への代替という新古典派に基づいた説明に対するサポートは限定的である). Fourth, institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization(労働組合組織率の低下に基づいた組織論的説明) also receive weak support. Finally, we provide evidence that highlights the offshoring of the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply chain(アメリカのサプライチェーンの労働集約的な構成要素の海外移転) as a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor shareover the past 25 years.
本文より
The headline measure published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (BLSより公表されたheadline measure代表的尺度？？) historically fluctuated around a mean of close to 64 percent from the immediate postwar period to the mid-1980s.
Thereafter, aside from a brief surge(急上昇・サージ電流は雷等に拠る電流急上昇) surrounding the tech bubble at the turn of the21st century(21世紀の変わり目の), this measure has displayed a downward trend, averaging around 58 percent in recent years, 6 percentage points below the level that prevailed during the first four decades of the postwar period.
…
●Autor, David, Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane (2003) ?The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An
Empirical Exploration" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279-1333.
Autor, David, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney (2006) ?The Polarization of the US Labor Market," American
Economic Review, 96(2), 189-194.
Autor, David, Lawrence Katz and Melissa Kearney (2008) ?Trends in US Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90(2), 300-323.
▲Card, David and John E. DiNardo (2002) ?Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles," Journal of Labor Economics 20, 733-783.
●Goos, Maarten and Alan Manning (2007) ?Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain," Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 118-133.
▲Manning, Alan (2004) ? We Can Work It Out: The Impact of Technological Change on the Demand for Low-Skill
Workers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 51(5), 581-603.
●Spitz-Oener, Alexandra (2006) ?Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational Demands: Looking outside
the Wage Structure," Journal of Labor Economics 24, 235-270.
…, certain features of specification of preferences are tied to basic growth observations for the U.S. economy. There is evidence that per capita leisure increased steadily until the 1930s. Since that time, and certainly for the postwar period, it has been approximately constant. We also know that real wages (defined as real average hourly rotal compensation[償い・埋め合わせ・代償・給与] ), including benefits and contributions for social insurance) have increased steadily in the postwar period. Taken together, these two observations imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure should be near unity. ...
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Lawrence F.K., Patterson, C., and Van Reenen, J.（2017）,“The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms”, NBER Working Paper No.23396
Elsby,M.,Hobijn,B.,andSahin,A.（2013）,“The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol47,no.2,pp.1-63
