404-1 名前: ころっけさん :2014/12/03(水) 04:40:11 ID:c0925434e [sage]
46 | VICTOR CHA
Likewise, we see a similar approach to South Korea, where economic interests and the
other interests China has on the peninsula right now lean in that direction, so we see them
emphasizing that relationship. I think this is going to continue going into the future.
So what does this mean for how the Chinese might be thinking about unifi cation? I very
much agree with Dr. Green that this idea of delayed unifi cation is in their interest. They don’t
want to see it happen anytime soon. Certainly, they believe that time is on their side? with
both sides of the relationship, especially with South Korea, where they do believe that, over
time, economics and other factors will allow them to have a stronger sway with South
Koreans. There is a sense, as well, that this way they will have a better set of eyes and ears
by reemphasizing their relationship with South Korea, getting a better feel on both sides on
the peninsula, and for how they are approaching Korean peninsula issues and potential for
unifi cation.
I do think over time that the Chinese won’t refl exively deny the interests or opportunity
for reunifi cation. But for now, the debate about whether or not that could happen and under
what terms has largely been shelved. I think the other thing to stress, in closing, with China’s
approach, is that it is my opinion that Xi Jinping actually is not paying a lot of attention to
North Korea policy or to Korean policy writ large, other than this warming to South Korea.
He set out the tenents to their approach, and he is letting it hold for now while he works on
issues with Rus sia, the relationship with the United States, and so on. Whereas with Hu
Jintao, the issue was a little more on the front lines and a lot of that was due to North Korea’s
behavior, I think with the Xi Jinping administration we are seeing the need to continue to
manage the relationship very carefully and strong concerns about what happens on the
Korean peninsula. But it is not going to be a strong driver for their diplomacy going forward.
Likewise, I think the fundamental reason for why we have been able to see this change
is because of Xi Jinping’s rapid consolidation of power, and the fact that he is running
Chinese foreign policy pretty much unilaterally. The formal mechanisms of Chinese diplo-
macy are not operating as much as they were under the previous leadership.
The foreign ministry has very little say on these policies. Even the party’s international
liaison department, which was very infl uential in shaping the relationship with North Korea
under the previous administration, does not have a whole lot to do with it at this stage. They
are certainly not the in de pen dent infl uence that they had before. We see this in the fact
that the Chinese foreign ministry has begun taking more of a role and managing the
mechanics of bilateral visits and so on with the China and North Korea relationship, and
that the international liaison department’s infl uence has been downgraded, and I expect
that to continue. Likewise, there is no one on this standing committee as was in the previ-
ous Politburo’s standing committee leadership, who really has a say on North Korea policy.
Zhou Yongkang, now famously in trouble with this corruption investigation, had been
educated in North Korea. Even though he was number nine of nine on the former Politburo
standing committee, he had undue infl uence on shaping North Korea policy. Then, you
have several members of that standing committee who, frankly, were very conservative on
KOREAN UNIFICATION IN A NEW ERA | 47
North Korea policy and wanted to see very little change. That is not the case in the new
Politburo standing committee, and Xi is certainly calling the tune on that, and I expect him
to continue doing so going forward.
Mr. Bruce Klingner, Heritage Foundation
